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ABSTRACT
Back To Square One: Understanding The Role of The Egyptian Armed Forces
By
Ahmed Ahmed
Advisor: Jillian Schwedler
Abstract: Six years ago, in 2011 the Egyptian youth took to the streets across Egypt
demanding freedom from the corrupt, autocratic, and authoritarian Mubarak government. Within
days, tens of millions of Egyptians demanded the resignation of President Mubarak, who had ruled
the country for 30 years. Millions of Egyptians were fed up with the rampant corruption of the
ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Democratic activists warned that presidential election
slated for September 2011 were not going to be competitive, rather successional so that Mubarak’s
son Gamal would be president. Most analysts argue that the vast masses of protests severely
damaged the ability of Mubarak to continue governing as the Arab Spring swept through the region.
While the protests were significant, the conventional analysis misses the role the Egyptian military
played in forcing the resignation of Hosni Mubarak in February of 2011. Discontent within the
military establishment against the rule of Mubarak had been building up, before climaxing in 2011.
Military officials held that the mismanagement of Egypt’s economy was a national security threat
even though the army controlled a significant portion of it. Top generals saw the increasing nature
of liberalization and privatization of the economy as an insurmountable contest between capital-rich
firms and a bogged down military bureaucracy. The influx of businessmen and non-military
appointments of government officials and parliamentarians sidelined the historical influence of the
military in Egyptian politics. With talks of hereditary succession pointing to educated British
banker, Gamal Mubarak’s rise to the political spotlight, the Egyptian military looked for the right
moment to regain their lost status. When the Arab Spring protests began, so did the opportunity to
I
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remove Mubarak from power. During the first few days of the protests, military establishment
leaders openly refused to condemn demonstrators. Instead many declarations legitimatized the
protests by stating ‘the demands of the people are legitimate and to be addressed.' With protesters
calling for no less than Mubarak’s resignation and the police force unable to control protests, the
government looked for the military to reestablish law and order. In response, the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces, a body consisting of the generals of each branch of the armed forces, met
without the commander-in-chief President Hosni Mubarak for the first time in the entirety of
Mubarak’s 30-year rule. The symbolic nature of that meeting and the statement by the military that
it would not intervene to break up demonstrations effectively destroyed any hope for Mubarak’s
survival, who resigned and was arrested a few days later. Egyptians celebrated and praised the
military for taking the side of the people, but unknown to most was whose interest the military acted
in, which was not democratic.
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While other analysts focus on the role of the demonstrators, I conclude that the Mubarak
government although severely threatened by the social movement was not shaken at all. The
cause for his removal from power did not originate from the millions on the ground; rather it
stemmed from the abandonment of Mubarak by the military, who let him fall from grace to
protect their role in ruling Egypt. In my research, I explore the relationship between the 30-year
reign of Mubarak and the Egyptian military. I analyze their interactions together with the factors
of emerging opposition movements, youth discontent, and crony economic liberalization, as a
method of explaining the military’s actions during the uprisings. Using primary resources;
including academic journals articles, books, government documents, and secondary sources;
newspaper articles, and Arabic reports written and discussed on television about the subject, I
provide an alternative explanation of the dynamics leading to the 2011 and 2013 reinstallation of
military rule. Supported by evidence of the economic and political resurrection of the military
post-2011 and 2013.
To do so, I first briefly describe the historical role of the Egyptian Military in society,
politics, and the economy. Second, by exploring the relationship between the army and Egypt’s
two other previous Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-1970) and Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), I
emphasize how the military’s autonomy and interests at many junctions are a point of contention
with the government. Third, I analyze in-depth the relationship between Mubarak and the
military during his 30-year reign. Showing how the relationship maintained periods of
cooperation before splitting apart over different economic and political interests. Fourth, I revisit
the 18-day uprising in doing so I provide a narrative of the events from the viewpoint of the
military. Fifth, I track the post-Mubarak and Morsi phase by showing how the military has
solidified its grip on Egypt, through a new military government. Lastly, concluding that uprisings
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only succeeded in overthrowing two governments due to the army’s intervention. That when
analyzing the underlying interests of the military it becomes clear why they behaved in that
manner.
Literature Review
Completed works on the Egyptian revolution and post-revolutionary Egypt is diverse and
covers a large range of topics. While some of the most popular literature surrounding the Arab
Spring and the Egyptian revolution focuses on the role of social media and youth mobilization to
account for the success of the movements, I differed in my approach. During my LR I looked for
articles and books that related to the Egyptian military and the relationship between the state.
Here I found that the literature addresses the military in these four ways 1: the civil-military
relationship between the executive branch of government and the military, 2: economic interests
the military was involved in, 3: the uprisings, and 4: post-2011 revolution transition phase and
the role of the military during that period. What I looked to do was built on the existing literature
to develop an analysis that centers on bringing to the forefront the role of the military in the 2011
and 2013 revolutions.
Civil-Military Relations
To understand the Egyptian military, Hillel Frisch argues that we need to view the
institution as not encompassing a “guardian role” for the ruling government but as a separate
institution with diverging interests. Using the David Pion-Berlin definition of a civil-military
institutional framework, Frisch finds the conditions that produce effective relationships between
a civilian government and military to be lacking in Egypt.
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The reason for this he finds is the presence of civilians in the major defense institutions
is missing. Second, the empowerment of defense ministries has grown from traditional advice
and consent roles, to figures who make their own decisions. Third, the military’s chain of
command operates within itself at a different hierarchy. Within the Egyptian military structure
exist a 23- member body called the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). It is
comprised of the top generals and high ranking officers from each branch of the army. However,
instead of reporting to the president, the council answers to directly the Defense Minister and his
appointed deputy. Decisions of war and troop mobilization are decided within the council and
not the parliament or executive branch. Frisch concludes that the modus operandi of the Egyptian
army is a high level of autonomy. For scholars analyzing the Arab Spring in the region, I found it
necessary to understand how the relationship between the government and the larger security
apparatuses affected the outcome of the revolutions.
As Peter Weber notes Tunisia and Egypt are today in such different places on the road to
democracy. Tunisia's professional military has traditionally steered clear of politics, and when
Ben Ali's government and fearsome security apparatus collapsed, the military remained neutral
and was widely respected for that. In Egypt, the military has been the strongest political faction
since the 1950s, and not only did it appear to take a side of the demonstrators, they played a vital
role not only in removing President Hosni Mubarak but also his democratically elected
successor, Mohamed Morsi1.
Eliezer Be’eri similarly described the Arab world as in a profound crisis of when it comes
to transitioning to democratic rule. To overcome this obstacle, he argues for a bottom-up

1

Weber, Peter. "How Tunisia Beat Egypt In The Democracy Game". Theweek.com. N.p., 2017. Web. 11 Mar. 2017.

Ahmed

4

revolutionary change that begins by alternating social structures of the institutions that affect
government. In many of the Arab Republics, historically no force has played a larger role in
reorganizing the system other than the officer corps. Military officers when empowered have
carried changes altering the democratic transition2.
In the months after the 2011 revolt, the Egyptian military took steps that were not
supportive of democracy nor human rights. More than 5,000 civilians and leaders of the
revolution were brought to military tribunals, denied adequate legal representation and sentenced
over dubious ‘national security’ crimes3. When Democratic activist rallied against these
detentions, they were met with extreme violence. One of the first events of brutal military
repression was the Maspero massacre. Soldiers killed 24 people, and over 200 were wounded in
the violence4. The military and the ruling SCAF showed they had little tolerance for dissent
during the period of transition.
Economic Empire & Patronage
Abul-Magd Zeinab, exploring the patronage the officer corps enjoyed in Egypt, develops
historical episodes that tell us of the great political leverage officers enjoyed. Zeinab does this by
analyzing the economic control the Egyptian military holds using three key phases. First, the
Camp David Accords in 1979 between Israel and Egypt, allowed the country to receive an
average of 1.3 billion dollars of U.S aid and millions more from European nations. Second, in the
1990s when Egypt began implementing Economic Liberalization programs to receive IMF loans,

2

Be’eri, E., 1966. The officer class in politics and society of the Arab East. Merhavya: Sifriat Poalim
[Hebrew].
3
"Egypt: Military Trials Usurp Justice System". Human Rights Watch. N.p., 2017. Web. 4 Apr. 2017.
4
"Cairo Clashes Leave 24 Dead After Coptic Church Protest - BBC News". BBC News. N.p., 2017. Web. 5 Apr.
2017.
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and third, in the 2000s, when a ripple in the relationship between the government and the army
arose, stemming from the privatization of State-owned enterprises.
Zeinab analyzes the growth of the Ministry of Military Production (MOMP) a separate
entity from the Defense Ministry. He finds that MOMP operates a whole 30 factories across the
country. Civilian products produced in these factories include; medical and diagnostic
equipment; domestic appliances; fire extinguishers, drills, television receivers, computers;
batteries, electric and water meters, cars, single engine aircraft, and a variety of foods5. As the
liberalization process intensified in Egypt, so did the competition between private companies and
the military. A predicament they were not happy to be in. One former Minister of MOMP
general Sayed Meshal who ran the industry stated that revenue in 1999 accounted for nearly 2
billion Egyptian pounds a year ($345 million) arising from the selling back of products to
civilians. Still, the official revenues of the military remain a secret in the ‘black box’ as it is
known in Egypt.
For this paper, I looked to confirm my political assumption that with the rise of a
business elite, the advantage military held in production diminished. Nadia Farah in her book
highlights the trend of privatization of many State-Owned Enterprises. Her findings suggest that
the emergence of the business elite posed an economic threat to the military who enjoyed near
domination in most areas of production. Describing that as private companies moved with more
technologically advanced production techniques and a larger access to capital, the military
struggled to innovate and expand. With Gamal Mubarak leading this charge, it is plausible to

5

"Ministry Of Military Production - Special Weapons Agencies - Egypt". Fas.org. N.p., 2017. Web. 29 Mar. 2017.
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believe the economic empire of the military would have ended had he taken power from his
father.
Robert Springborg commenting on the expansive nature of involvement of the military in
the economy says the question is not what sectors do they invest in, but rather: is there a sector
that they do not invest in? Estimates have said the army accounts for anywhere between 10 to 40
percent of Egypt's entire economy6. Mubarak during his tenure had no issue in allowing the
military to enter the economic frontier initially. In 1981, the nation had already brokered peace
with arch rival Israel. The issue of independence, sovereignty, war and peace, was settled. New
concerns moved onto public discussions such as infrastructure revitalization, and industrial
productivity. To gain military support for his government, Mubarak endorsed pay raises, benefit
housing and a diversification of the weapons portfolio. Springborg concluded that Mubarak
might have been trying to pamper a major constituency as he sought to widen backing for other
items on his political agenda, including efforts to promote Egyptian democracy and economic
efficiency.
Uprisings
When the revolt began, many analysts scrambled to understand what the military would
do. Scholars like Ibrahim Karawan argued that the army did not want power because “it does not
have much to offer, and it knows it.” Concluding that army leadership was keen to pursue rapid
constitutional reform to prepare the way for free and fair elections”7. Although the conditions
leading up the revolt were not indicative that Mubarak nor the army were keen to allowing free

6
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Kholaif, Dahlia. "The Egyptian Army's Economic Juggernaut". Aljazeera.com. N.p., 2017. Web. 30 Mar. 2017.

Karawan, Ibrahim A. "Politics and the Army in Egypt." Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 53 (2011): 43-50.
JSTOR. Web. 25 Mar. 2017.
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elections. Jeff Martini and Julie Taylor argue the military decided to intervene in the uprising
because “The generals felt their influence slipping away as Mubarak disregarded their economic
interests, ignored their advice on ministerial appointments, and organized a campaign to transfer
power to his son against their wishes”8. However, they prematurely conclude that the actions of
the military were not meant to “overthrow Mubarak”, rather, the intervention was only intended
to reposition the power dynamics away from crony capitalism and the NDP.
These analyses miss key moments in the uprisings. One such example is the SCAF
excluded Mubarak from their meeting. It also neglects the declarations issued by the military
recognizing the demands of the people as legitimate and the proclamation that it would not
disperse protesters. With demands for Mubarak to resign, the military took a de facto stand with
the demonstrators.
Witold Mucha and Ahmed Khalifa see the military intervention as a signal of maintaining
stability and imposing de-escalation measures. They argue that the role of armed forces from the
onset of the protests applied a stabilizing function and not a political one. Explaining that
military wanted to avoid conflict because it craves order. They conclude that the army did not
open fire to prevent any identification of the military with Mubarak’s security forces.
Understanding that repressive behavior by the military could have furthered activist to arm
themselves to defend their cause9. The analysis is correct to point out that the military certainly
views themselves as separate entities, in which the stability of the nation is not dependent on the

8

Martini, Jeff. "Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future." Foreign
Affairs 90.5 (2011): 127-37. JSTOR. Web. 7 Mar. 2017
9
Mucha, Witold, and Ahmed Khalifia. "The Military In Egypt Peacemaker With Expiration Date?". Journal of
African Militaries N/A.N/A (2017): 1-23. Print.
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government in charge. The paper neglected to address the underlying interests the military works
to achieve.
My analysis considers the literature in a way that incorporates the many arguments into
one. Highlighting the interests of the military as a way of explaining their actions beyond just a
security minded viewpoint.
Post-2011 Resurgence
While many activists involved in the January 25th protests initially viewed the military as
guardians of the transition, they came to realize that the military, led by the SCAF, was only
interested in maintaining its superiority. As early as February 25th, 2011, the military began
using force to remove protesters from Tahir Square and other areas of gathering. Curfews were
imposed. Dina Bishara argued the military’s role in the uprisings was a defensive response to
protect the state, that happened to provide an opprotunity to reclaim lost power. Following the
SCAF transition period she find that Constitutional Proclamations issued by SCAF strengthened
both the role of the military in politics and its autonomy from civilian institutions10. Army
oﬃcers voiced their intention to see an article introduced in the future constitutions which
guarantees the military’s vision to “belong to the people” rather than to a government. Also
ensuring financial and organizational independence of the armed forces from the presidency and
parliament.

10

Albrecht, Holger, and Dina Bishara. "Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt."
Middle East Law and Governance 3 (2011): 13-23. Brill. Web. 5 Dec. 2016
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Historical Background:
The Egyptian army for six decades has been a solid institutional pillar of the modern
Egyptian Republic. In 1952, a group of military officers headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser led a
coup d état against the British-backed monarchy of King Farouk. The officers aimed at not just
removing the king, but at also creating a new political system. Running off popular support for
the overthrow of the king, the officers moved to suppress political movements they labeled to be
weak and corrupted by foreign influence. Power in the new system was consolidated into a
highly centralized presidential system11, headed by a single political party called the Arab
Socialist Union (ASU). Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s first military president, in 1954 led the
country through its post-colonial transition. The ASU drew its support from the populist,
egalitarian policies it enacted. Abolishing formal titles, redistributing land ownership to peasant
farmers, and having a populist economic approach, they allowed them to cement governing
legitimacy.
Under Nasser’s presidency from 1956-1970, the executive office was turned into an
unchecked authority, which drew most political appointments from the military12. Civil society
was curtailed, movements like the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and labor unions became illegal

11

Angrist, Michele Penner, Nathan J. Brown, Emad Shahin, and Joshua Stacher.Politics & Society in the
Contemporary Middle East Chapter Egypt Page 218. 2nd ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013. Print.
12
Angrist, 2013
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under Law 3213 which placed restrictions on the formation and activities of NGOs. Citizens
faced incarceration for participating in any group deemed illegal by the government.
The Egyptian military emerging from a colonial army underwent modernization under
Nasser. With the state using over $216 million dollars in 195514 to expand the size of the
military. The Pan-Arabism political and social ideology echoed by Nasser was the driving force
behind growing the role of the military. The resources of the state were steered toward the
military, whose engineers and contractors took the lead in land reclamation projects, public
infrastructure development, the administration of essential commodities, and the domestic
manufacturing of consumer appliances and electronics, as well as the production of industrial
and agricultural inputs like steel and fertilizer. High-ranking members of the officer corps were
also appointed to replace civilian factory managers15.
Nasser was convinced that Egypt had a stake in defending Arab nations from what he
considered to be “imperialist Arab governments” and sought to expand officer corps ideology to
the region. Nasser, ordered the dispatch of the Egyptian military and police for training missions
to Yemen in 1954 and 195716, to assist military officers in Yemen carry out a overthrow against
the Saudi and British-backed monarchy. The intervention was a complete and utter failure for
Nasser and the military. Labeled as Egypt’s Vietnam, the intervention caused the Egyptian

13

Angrist, 2013
"Gamal Abdel Nasser." New World Encyclopedia. World Encyclopedia, 25 May 2007. Web. 30 Jan. 2017.
<http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Gamal_Abdel_Nasser>.
15
Hicham Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial Rewards
of Egypt’s Military Elite, 1981–2011,” Middle East Journal 67, no. 4 (Autumn
2013)
16
Ferris, Jesse. Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian
Power. Princeton: Princeton Page 32 , 2013. Print.
14
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economy to decline due to deteriorating US-Egyptian relations, leading to the ending of a vital
food program upon which the Egyptian economy depended on17.
Egyptians began to feel disillusioned with the military government of Nasser. When the
humiliating six-day war defeat occurred in 1967, there were hints that a collapse of the
administration and the military was imminent. Across Egypt, riots broke out against the military,
whom many Egyptians called traitors and cowards for failing to maintain territorial integrity over
the Sinai Peninsula from Israeli aggression. The Pan-Arab dream of having the strongest army in
the region suddenly disappeared because of gross negligence in its leadership18.
Nasser prepared his resignation speech in June 1967, claiming he was responsible for
the swift defeat of Egypt’s military forces. Nasser would later decide against resigning and
instead offered 50 senior officers and members of the Egyptian ruling elite to stand trial on the
22nd of January 1968. They were indicted for crimes related to national security, including
charges of plotting to overthrow the government19. Light sentences were handed down by a
sympathetic court, but the military’s supremacy in the public eye was severely diminished.
Early Protests Against Authoritarian Policies
University students began leading protests against Nasser. Calling for the start of
democratization in Egypt. Anwar Sadat, who at the time was Vice-President and a prominent
officer in the military, met with student protesters to mediate relations between the government
and them. Nasser agreed to concessions by ordering the holding of new elections, establishing a

17

Ferris, 2013
Karawan, Ibrahim A. 2011.
19
Blanga, Yehuda. "Turmoil in Egypt – 1968–2011: The Status of the Armed Forces in Citizen Uprisings in Egypt."
Contemporary Politics 20.2 (2014): 365-383(Page 5). Web. 8 Mar. 2017.
<http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.library.csi.cuny.edu/toc/ccpo20/20/3#.VSRnxvnF-Qw>.
18
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new administration, and replacing military members of the government20. Nasser hoped to rally
support by averting attention from the dire economic state of the nation to focus on preparing for
a new battle against Israel.
When Gamal Abdel Nasser died in 1970, and Anwar Sadat became President, he sought
to avoid the same mistakes that plagued his predecessor. Sadat realized that the oppressive ruling
that brutally repressed speech, media, and dissent would not garner patience for his inevitable
war against Israel. Sadat began to “demilitarize” the Egyptian state by significantly reducing the
number of army officers in government positions, and ordering the military to focus more on
preparing for war21. Sadat shifted the military’s expansive economic grip on industries to focus
more narrowly on defense-related manufacturing. By 1980, Sadat’s last administration, less than
five ministerial positions were held by military men, compared to 22 of 26 in 196422.
Sadat’s “corrective revolution” as he called it, relaxed the implementation of Law 32 and
allowed for NGOs, syndicates, and political groups to emerge. Under Sadat, civil society groups
could pluralize the discourse of politics and economics. Discontent against Sadat’s opposition for
a quick war with Israel grew quickly among students. It was in 1971 that the first unified
opposition movements emerged. The Higher National Committee of Cairo University Students
and the Student Union, held a 20,000-people strong demonstration against Sadat in Liberation
Square23, known today as Tahir Square.
The protests were violently quelled by security forces, but their request was heard. Sadat
quickly moved to restart diplomatic negotiations with Western powers to attain a peaceful
20

Blanga, Yehuda.2014.
Blanga, Yehuda. 2014.
22
Springborg, Robert. "The President and the Field Marshal: Civil-Military Relations in Egypt Today." MERIP
Middle East Report No. 147.Egypt's Critical Moment (1987): JSTOR. Web. 13 Feb. 2017.
23
Blanga, Yehuda 2014
21
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settlement over the Sinai Peninsula while seriously preparing for war. The students’ demands
were fulfilled on October 6th, 1973, in the Yom Kippur War, which many Egyptians hold as the
resurrection of the nation. It was the first time in post-colonial Egypt that an alternative force
besides the military influenced government policy.
Prequel To 2011
The war earned the Sadat government and the military a big boost in popularity. In the
aftermath of the war, the Egyptian army faced the question of how their institution would survive
a lack of hostilities. In government, they were already in transition to being another bureaucracy.
Sadat, now entering negotiations with Western powers, held that economic liberalization was the
path most necessary for Egypt’s economic development.
Sadat’s government began by privatizing large state-run firms and returned land that had
been nationalized under Nasser to its former owners. The policy had the desired effect of
attracting foreign investment. State-sponsored subsidies which many segments of the population
relied on, needed to be removed for Egypt to receive a $40 million dollar loan from the World
Bank24. For the military, this was a threat to the egalitarian economic policies they implemented
since 1952. Military generals warned Sadat that economic insecurity of the growing population
would be a grave threat to Egyptian national security and advised him not to continue with these
steps25.
The liberalization continued despite military opposition and caused enormous social gaps
and rampant government corruption26. Cumulating into the bread riots of January 1977. The riots
24

1977: Egypt's Bread Intifada". Libcom.org. N.p., 2017. Web. 25 Mar. 2017.
Nassef, Sharif. "Shifting Sands: Political Liberalization Of Egypt Since 1952 - Fair Observer". Fair Observer.
N.p., 2017. Web. 21 Mar. 2017.
26
Blanga, Yehuda 2014.
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posed a significant threat to the stability of Sadat. Police were unable to control the outbreak of
violence across the country, causing Sadat to order the military to help restore stability to the
nation. Police stations, railways, and the headquarters of the ruling Egypt Arab Socialist Party in
Cairo were attacked and set on fire.
The military refused to intervene unless the subsidies were reinstated first27. Sadat caved
into the demands of the public and reversed his decision. Soldiers deployed to control the
protests and participated in baking bread for citizens using wheat reserves stored by the
military28. The riots and contention over subsidies showed how the military could use its strong
coercive power of stability to make the government adhere to their interests. Had the bread riots
continued without the military intervention, Sadat’s government would have surely suffered
damages at a time where he was securing the Camp David accords. The strongman image Sadat
broadcast to world required a firm and stable government.
Death of Sadat
In 1978, Anwar Sadat dissolved the ASU, symbolically ending Nasser’s and the free
officers’ political legacy. A new party was formed called the National Democratic Party (NDP),
where the chairperson was the President of the country. ASU leaders renounced their former
party memberships and flocked to the new NDP in droves29. Leaving the policies and faces
mostly the same as the ASU. Sadat remained chairman up until his assassination on October 6th,
1981, at a military celebration commemorating their victory over Israeli forces in 1973.

27

Karawan, Ibrahim A. 2011.
Mahr, Krista. "Bread Is Life: Food And Protest In Egypt | TIME.Com". TIME.com. N.p., 2017. Web. 15 Mar.
2017.
29
Heiss, Andrew. "The Failed Management Of A Dying Regime: Hosni Mubarak Egypt’s National Democratic
Party and the January 25th Revolution." Journal of Third World Studies XXIX.1 (2012): 1-18. JSTOR. Web. 2 Mar.
2017.
28

Ahmed 15

Subversive conscripted Islamists within the army turned their guns on Sadat for signing the
historic Camp David Accords in 1979, which recognized and normalized diplomatic relations
with Israel.
The Emergence of Hosni Mubarak
Hosni Mubarak, the former commander of the Egyptian Air Force and Vice-President,
became Egypt’s third president on October 7th, 1981. He became the new chairman of the NDP
immediately after becoming President. Mubarak’s first declaration as President was the
enactment of Law 1958/64, which placed Egypt under a perpetual state of emergency. Under the
law, the President could at any time “whenever public security or order are threatened, by oral or
written order carry out these acts: 1. Restrict people’s freedom of assembly, movement,
residence, or passage in particular times and places; arrest suspects or [individuals who are]
dangerous to public security and order [and] detain them; allow searches of persons and locations
without being restricted by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code30, 2. Order the
surveillance of letters of any type; supervise censorship; seize journals, newsletters, publications,
editorials, cartoons, and any form of expression and advertisement before they are published, and
close their publishing places”31.
The interior ministry and the Central Security Forces (CSF), both of which were run by
NDP members, became the primary enforcers of the emergency law. CSF membership was
around 300,00032 shortly after Sadat’s death. Empowering the security force was vital for
Mubarak to have an alternative to the military’s ambiguous support for the government. With a

30

Emergency. Law article. 2.
Emergency. Law article. 3.
32
Springborg, Robert. 1987.
31
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large police force equipped to intercept and repress opposition, the government would be free
implement their policies without fear of being dependent on the military for stability.
Mubarak at the same time began ushering in a similar but altered role for the military.
The Ministry of Defense in 1981 created an economic arm called the National Service Products
Organization (NSPO) separate from the MOMP. This arm of the military contributed to public
infrastructure projects to produce cheap civilian goods for the middle and lower classes33. The
NSPO had its budget and bank account cloaked from civilan oversight and immune from the
Central Auditing Organization. Making its income and expenses secret from the public domain34.
Under the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, no article legally mandated oversight of the military’s
annual budget or any of the related security and defense agencies.
Defense Minister Abu Ghazala in 1982 looked to transform the military into a for profit
institution for the country. Through a system of patronage, Ghazala was able to secure benefits
for the officer corps not seen before in post-colonial Egypt. The military was no longer devoted
exclusively to warfare preparation; it broadened activities dramatically into areas that are
traditionally civilian35. The military began heading out into poor regions and started building up
cities. Areas like Nasr city on the outskirts of Cairo were primarily made for military members
and their families. The army would construct large apartment blocks using conscripted force as
cheap labor and would sell back the estate to the rest of the population at a significant profit
margin. Competition between the military and the private sector grew unbalanced. Civilian

33

Abul-Magd, Zeinab. "The Egyptian Military in Politics and the Economy: Recent History and Current Transition
Status." Everyday Maneuvers: Military - Civilian Relations in Latin-America and the Middle Eas 2 (2012): 16. JSTOR. Web. 15 Mar. 2017.
34
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companies complained about the lack of access to building contracts handed out by the
government.
In essence, Mubarak created a de facto pact with the military. He and the NDP would
continue to support the military in expanding their commercial network in return for the stability
they provided for backing his government. From the military’s standpoint, they were able to rule
but were not needed to govern. Mubarak, still was shown to be weak without military support.
This became apparent when the CSF started rioting in February of 1986 over the low wages they
received. For two days, the Interior Ministry was unable to maintain public order, like his
predecessors Mubarak looked to the military to re-establish control over the country. The riots
showcased to the NDP and Mubarak that the real protector and keeper of the government was the
military.
Growing the Patronage: Economic Liberalization & Crony Capitalism
Mubarak in the 1990s began edging Egypt towards full economic liberalization under the
terms set forth by the $370 million dollar loan provided by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)36. Dozens of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were privatized, and state sponsored
subsidies to the poor were cut dramatically37. Mubarak sold SOEs to fellow NDP members who
in turn shared profits with the party and the government. Mubarak signed Egypt to the Economic
Restructuring and Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in 1991, and with it38 came the erosion of
social safety nets. Income inequality between the wealthy and poor grew exponentially as the
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year 2000 approached, with 22% of the population living in poverty at just under $2 a day39. The
liberalization process effectively ended the state-run economy put in place by Nasser and the free
officers.
Social protest at the time was minimal: as the government security apparatus was ruthless
to any form of public dissent. Security forces were in the midst of putting down a violent Islamist
insurgency in the ancient city of Luxor spearheaded by terror group called Gamaa al-Islamiyya.
The terrorist campaign killed over 1,200 Egyptians from 1992- 1997. Mubarak instituted new
regulations that began to dictate the time, place, and degree of all political discussions40. Secret
police roamed public areas searching for dissidents. Thousands of alleged dissenters and other
enemies of the state were incarcerated, tortured, and killed41.
Tensions Arise: The New Guard, Gamal Mubarak, And the Rise of The Business Elite
The emergence of the business class into politics placed a third actor in the middle of the
government and the military. Headed by Mubarak’s youngest son Gamal, a British-educated
banker, the NDP had an influx of businessmen who held differing economic intentions than that
of the military. Political participation by the business elite in Egypt’s parliament increased from
8 elected officials in 1995 to 150 by 2005 elections42.
These businessmen helped influence Egypt’s increased privatization of many industries
that the state once controlled. The steel industry, once a state-owned enterprise became a
monopoly consisting of one company owned by infamous NDP member named Ahmed Ezz.
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Many Egyptians regard him as a corrupt and deplorable individual who created a business
environment that made it impossible to buy an apartment due to the high construction cost of
steel. Close associate of Gamal Mubarak, Ezz controlled two-thirds of the steel market, giving
him the ability to control the price of an essential building material43. Both engaged in patronage
relationship that was masked in the language of the free market. During the revolution of 2011
Ezz’s name was condemned by protesters alongsde with Hosni Mubarak.
For the military privatization was a significant threat to its vast economic empire44. State
enterprises quickly passed into the hands of crony capitalists. As neoliberal reforms expanded,
the military found itself with severe competition from their neoliberal counterparts with access to
a greater amount of capital45. The military involved in many civilian production sectors such as
steel, wheat, automobiles, food items, electronic appliances, and cement struggled to maintain a
competitive edge. To offset against the Mubarak government campaign of economic
liberalization and privatization, Egypt’s military leaders diversified their financial portfolio.
Beginning with financing technology from foreign and domestic private sector sources, as well
as joint partnerships with a variety of nonmilitary businessmen and foreign interests. Embarking
on projects such as building wind farms, medicine, and medical facilities. Leaving the Egyptian
state liable for potential financial losses while the military enjoyed de facto control over
revenues46.
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Mubarak attempted to calm their fears by using the funds generated from Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) to fill the pockets of loyal generals. By giving them something in return,
Mubarak hoped for complete subordination to the office of the president47. Many viewed
Mubarak’s eagerness to attain the support of top generals as a safety mechanism for the
succession of his son Gamal to the presidency. Since becoming president in 1981, Mubarak had
refused to appoint a Vice-President or second in command, unlike his predecessors; even after
narrowly escaping an assassination attempt on his life in June of 1995 in Ethiopia.
In the year 2000, Gamal took his first steps in the top echelons of politics when he
became Assistant Secretary- General of the NDP: third in command to the chairperson48 (Hosni
Mubarak). The military establishment saw with increasing discomfort the rise of Gamal Mubarak
as his father’s heir apparent49.
More worrying for them was the events transpiring in Syria at the same time. Bashar Al
Assad inherited power in a single-candidate election from his father Hafez Al-Assad when he
died in the year 2000. Hafez was public about the succession of his son(s), unlike Mubarak. The
Syrian parliament, shortly before Hafez died, enacted constitutional amendments that lowered
the required presidential age from 40 to 34, the age of Bashar at the time50. Hafez made Bashar
enlist in the military in 1999, and he quickly rose to Colonel ranking. This was a last-ditch
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attempt to garner support within the Syrian army after his long-serving military son Basil Assad
abruptly perished in an automobile accident in 199451.
The Egyptian Military and the public were not accepting to moves of Gamal’s rise to
attaining the presidency because Egyptians viewed this as a step back towards the familial rule.
They joked that Egypt was returning to the days of the pharaohs except without the vast amounts
of gold. Speculation of succession was avoided by Mubarak and the government until it became
unavoidable in the last days of the government.
The Illusion of Political Competition
The NDP under the influence of Gamal and what political scientists in Egypt referred to
as the “new guard” (comprised of business elites and young, affluent members) of the party,
introduced a constitutional amendment in Parliament that made it possible for the first time in
Egypt’s history to hold direct presidential elections slated for September 200552. Democratic
activist viewed this as a positive step for democratization. Political parties in Egypt had grown
substantially over the years. Notable groups included April 6th, a youth-centered political party,
and the Egyptian Movement for Changed known as Kifaya53, which translates to “Enough”54, a
direct reference to the frustration with the long tenure of Mubarak. For the first time they could
bring forward to the public discourse a wide range of topics from economic policy and societal
issues, to police brutality.
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Mubarak announced his bid for re-election at the age of 77, and the opposition rallied
around presidential candidate Ayman Noor of the Future Party, who became the first person in
Egypt’s history to challenge a sitting president. The elections were marred by accusations of
police intimidation against opposition voters. Independent observers and press were prohibited
from overseeing the elections. In the end, Mubarak won with 88.6% of the vote55.Opposition
members questioned the legitimacy of the elections. Noor was subsequently arrested by security
forces short after on charges of forging elections documents and was sent to prison for five years,
where he was subjected to torture before being released on medical grounds in 2009.
Mubarak promised in his new presidential term to appoint a vice-president, further
encourage political freedoms, and to address the economic poverty many faced. However, fears
in the military and public of hereditary- succession grew when Mubarak refused to designate a
vice-president56. Citizens encountered rising costs in July of 2006 as the government increased
the prices of transportation, electricity, and communications, placing further pressures on
workers’ limited incomes57, coupled with a steady rise of inflation. Mubarak sought to counter
any hint of instability by increasing the budget of the CSF and the interior ministry headed by
dispised Habib Al Hadley from $583 million in 2002 to $3.3 billion in 2008 compared to the
srmy’s budget that merely doubled58. The government ensured that opposition movements,
demonstrations, and elections were carefully monitored and stiflied. Egypt drifted deeper into a
police state, rather than a military state.
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The End Of Mubarak
2011 was set to be Mubarak’s final year as President. Elections were set for September
2011. Public opinion polls conducted, as Arafat reports, say Egyptians realized the NDP were
actively promoting Gamal and selling his image to the public. In the years and months pre-dating
the revolution, Gamal had been accompanying his father on many international visits, including
to the United States. These were measures taken to prepare him for the presidency. However, the
polls also indicated that not all Egyptians saw a Gamal presidency as a negative aspect. To some,
the Mubarak family had been a pillar of stability and economic growth. Tourism industries
boomed under him, and a middle-class began to slowly emerge. Arafat concedes, overcoming
public opposition may have been possible, but overcoming his lack of military affiliation and
persuading the generals to back him is an entirely different task.59
Leaked WikiLeaks cables signal that hypotheses might be true. In one these tapes,
Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi can allegedly be heard strongly objecting to Gamal, due to his
economic policies. Advising his deputies that Gamal would not only threaten their interests but
the interests of Egypt as a whole60. Other senior military officials held that it would wipe out the
glory of the July 1952 Revolution (the Free Officers’ Revolution)61. A collision course between
the army and the government looked unavoidable.
The last two years of the Mubarak government (2008–2010) witnessed an increase in the
number of demonstrations, protests, sit-ins and strikes by workers62. The Military advised the
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government to implement more wage increases and subsidies to curb the growing poverty rate
that neared 27% in 2010. Nearly 40% of the population by 2011 lived on under two dollars a
day63. The social upheaval was brewing. It just needed a spark.
Signs of a pending revolt came in April of 2008 when workers of the textile industry
staged a general strike in the city of Mahalla. The opposition movement called for labor unions
across the country to join in. Doctors, engineers, and public workers vowed to stop working. The
government and the CSF warned that they would “take necessary and resolute measures toward
any attempt to demonstrate, impede traffic, hamper work in public facilities or to incite civildisobedience this”64. Riot police arrested and beat workers, amidst a massive deployment of CSF
stifled protests. The government succeeded in bottling up the anger temporarily, but citizens
tolerance for the status quo grew shorter by the day.
Revolution 2011
The trigger for revolt came in neighboring Tunisia on December 17th, 2010, when a street
vendor named Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire in front of local government building, in
Sidi Bouzid, a rural town in Tunisia65. Images of his self-immolation after being humiliated by
security forces who destroyed his products and assaulted him were broadcast throughout the
Arab world through social media, television, and newspapers. Protests engulfed Tunisia until
they reached the capital of Tunis on December 27th. President Ben Ali, who had ruled the small
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Arab nation for 25 years, found his government crumbling without the support of the military.
He fled to Saudi Arabia, leaving a caretaker government in charge.
Egyptians watched the events transpire in Tunisia and felt empowered to act. Like
Mohammed Bouazizi was the Egyptian case of Khalid Said, whose bloodied tortured body was
left outside a police station in Alexandria after being arrested at a café a night before in June
2010. Graphic images of his body circulated throughout Egyptian private media. Protests were
held in Tahir Square, Alexandria, Luxor and the other main cities in July of 2010 denouncing
police brutality66.
The April 6th movement in early January of 2011 named the initial protest against
Mubarak “We are all Khaled Said”. Viral videos of young Egyptians vowing to partake in the
protests quickly spread online. January 25th became a save-the-day event, which fell on National
Police Day. Government officials downplayed the significance of the protests stating that “the
youth just want to blow off some steam.” Mubarak was confident in the ability of the CSF to
maintain order saying, “Egypt is not Tunisia.”
Tens of thousands of protesters flocked to protest meet ups across Egypt’s major cities.
Security forces initially allowed protesters to enter public squares but quickly began attempting
to disperse crowds with tear gas, concussion grenades, rubber bullets, and live ammunition.
Injuries and fatalities mounted quickly. January 28th saw the fiercest of street battles between
protesters and CSF; images of the carnage on the street stoked fears of a coming civil war.
When the protests intensified, Mubarak attempted to fulfill some overdue demands.
He appointed the country's head of intelligence Omar Suleiman to the post of vice-president, and
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Ahmad Shafiq, a former chief of the air force, was selected prime minister in a cabinet
reshuffle67. Mubarak attempted to appease the people by dissolving the primary leadership
structure of the NDP. He remained party chairman but appointed Hossam Badrawy a centrist
liberal as the secretary-general68. Ahmed Izz, the steel tycoon, resigned from the NDP as
protesters burned portraits of his face in Tahir Square. Protesters targeted the NDP headquarters
situated two blocks from the historic center of the protests in Cairo. The building was set ablaze
by the demonstrators, after being ransacked.
Military Intervention
With carnage on the streets, the military emerged openly on the political scene for the
first time in years. Declaring that it supports a democratic transition according to the
constitutional plan offered by the leaders of both sides. Demonstrators ideveloped the narrative
of military backing because that was what they wanted to believe. Egyptians viewed the military
as the only non-elitist institution because it is made up of conscripted force. More importantly,
they wanted the army to see itself as separate from the corrupt government. Hoping that by
appealing to the moral stature of the military, they would make it difficult for the military
generals to take a decisive stand for the government, despite the bias of senior officers who saw
the president as a source of generous patronage77.
According to Springborg, during the days before Mubarak stepped down, the military
was enjoying wide, popular support while other elements of the government absorbed popular
anger, despite being subordinate to the military69. The military was able to exploit the
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revolutionary sentiments of Egyptians to justify its withdrawal as the backer of the Mubarak‘s
government. In playing with these feelings, the military aligned itself with the efforts of
protesters to the extent that it could be seen as protecting the people against a now illegitimate
government. As such, many of the protesters were undeterred by violence because they knew the
military would step in to protect them.
Discussions about a post-Mubarak Egypt was in full-swing across the country, and the
noose around the government neck grew by the day. Protesters overwhelmed the CSF, leading to
a majority of officers defecting and withdrawing from the streets. Mubarak summoned the
military deployment into the streets to restore order by enforcing a curfew in the main cities. On
January 30th, 2011, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and republican guards were stationed in
Egypt’s cities. Protesters cheered the military as liberators as they entered city centers and
squares. Soldiers did nothing to hold back tens of thousands of demonstrators defying the curfew
and even moved armored vehicles in front of a crowd to defend against attacks by remaining
CSF members and hired thugs70.
The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), a military body consisting of 23 top
generals from the branches of the armed forces met on February 10th, in the absence of the
commander-in-chief and newly appointed Vice President Suleiman71. This was the third time in
its history that they convened without the commander-in-chief, the previous times occurred in
1967, and 1973 both of which took place during wartime. They released a strong message after
the meeting stating that the military would not fire nor disperse protesters. Adding that the
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people’s demands were legitimate72. The SCAF in series of press communiques added “honest
people refused the corruption and demanded reforms, we warn against touching the security and
safety of the nation and the people73. Both the public and the military shared the same objective,
the removal of Mubarak, and an end to the government.
The Mubarak government perhaps sensing that without the CSF crushing protesters, and
with the reluctance of the military to intervene on their behalf, that the end had come. Instead of
having a humiliating public military coup, the government decided on portraying a dignified exit
instead. Omar Suleiman on the night of February 11th, 2011, read Mubarak’s final public
statement announcing his resignation, and annoucing governing power would be given to the
SCAF. Historically marking an end to the 30-year rule of Mubarak.
The actions of the military went widely unestimated in the media during the 2011
revolution for understandable reasons. Many credited the protesters’ non-violent measures and
social media usage as the root for the collapse of the government. Hirschkind argues “activist
bloggers from across broad political spectrums were brought together online through a shared
sense of what were the most pressing policy challenges Egyptians faced”74. The unification of
rivals on social media indeed created an imminent threat to the government. This was made
evident by the event on January 29th, 2011 when Egyptians lost all cell phone and internet
service. The shutdown caused a 90 percent drop in data traffic to and from Egypt, crippling an
important communications tool used by antigovernment protesters and their supporters to
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organize and to spread their message75. Despite the shutdown, protesters managed to gather in
protest areas, due to networking structures of civil society.
Others like Albrecht and Bishara argue that the military was reluctant to intervene in the
uprising but did so because they feared a larger crisis. They state “the military’s intervention here
could be seen as an attempt to manage the unfolding crisis temporarily…. it was not clear that
the army had ambitious plans to assume a more prominent role in politics”76. While the military
craves order, it had shown in the past that the survival of the government was not mutually
exclusive to stability. Showcased shortly after February 18th when Mubarak, Gamal, Alaa
(Mubarak’s oldest son), Habib Al Hadley, Ahmed Izz, and other cronies of the government were
immediately placed under arrest by the military. The military charged them with corruption,
killing protesters, embezzlement, and betraying the public trust77.
Solidifying Gains: Post-Mubarak Transition
Pro-democracy activists were elated with the military’s action during the 18-day uprising,
and they looked for them to move the process forward. For the army, their interest was
reestablishing control over the country. The belief in building a democratic political system
remained low on the priority list. In the months after the 2011 revolution, Egypt did experience
some small but significant moves towards democracy. The SCAF legalized political parties that
were once banned. Instituted presidential terms limits, strengthened judicial oversight of
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elections, and created a more transparent process for the registration of political parties78. These
measures not only satisfied the demands of the revolutionaries but guaranteed the military that no
powerful executive would emerge to face them. The diversity of the political parties also ensured
that an NDP similar monopoly on power would be impossible to develop.
In March 2011, the SCAF declared a constitutional declaration that unilaterally amended
55 provisions of the 1971 constitution. The most significant amendments empowered the
military’s interest. It legally prohibited civilian oversight of the army’s budget, mandated the
military would elect a defense minister from its ranks rather than be appointed, declared that
decisions of war rested solely with the SCAF, and affirmed not to take presidential opinions into
considerations79.
The generals sought to maintain their economic and political status within a demanding
population. The military feared that prolonged public governing of the country would lead to
growing backlash against them. However, relinquishing power before securing their stake in
Egypt’s future was also counterproductive. Activists became discontent with the prolonged
response of authorities in bringing accused killer cops to judicial proceedings. They held that
remnants, called Faloul in Arabic, Mubarak officials within the security apparatus, remained in
control. According to Norton “five million Egyptians worked for the government. This included
a multitude of security forces that are dedicated to controlling political space, ferreting out
dissent, and short-circuiting even innocuous challenges to the state…. the internal security
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apparatus was largely untouched by the ‘Revolution’80”. In July of 2011, protesters took to the
streets denouncing the military’s failure to address the deteriorating economic status
adequately81.
In response, a clamp down on democratic activists from 2011- 2012 led to over 7,000
people, including bloggers, journalists, and protesters, being tried in closed military trials82.
Reports of women being subjected to cruel and humiliating “virginity tests” drew widespread
international condemnation against the SCAF83. The initial positive image the military gained
during the revolution began to fade away as numerous, successive blunders and missteps
highlighted its self-interested political and economic motives. The events weakened its
popularity and called into question the sincerity of its role as the defender of the Egyptian state84.
The SCAF moved quickly to hold parliamentary elections, hoping to shift scrutiny to
civilian leaders. Newly formed political parties scrambled to develop electoral networks across
Egypt. Elections were slated for November 2011, and only Islamist parties like the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) and their political offshoot the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the ultraconservative Islamic Salafist Nour Party had pre-existing networks that assisted them in securing
votes. Democratic and youth activists accused the military of agreeing to early elections as a part
of a pact with Islamist groups. As upheaval grew, the Muslim Brotherhood actively reined in its
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young supporters. Discouraging them from participating in anti-SCAF protests in the months
leading up to the parliamentary and presidential elections of 201285.
Secular parties failed to establish support bases in the few shorts months after being
legally established. Their failure to do so can be attributed to the oppressive atmosphere they
operated in under Mubarak. While the MB and other Islamist groups were banned during the
governments of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, were able to form support through charities,
Islamic schools, mosques, and free health clinics.
Islamist parties won in a landslide fashion claiming 358 out of 508 seats in parliament,
giving them a majority of 66 out of 100 seats on the parliamentary constitutional committee
tasked with drafting Egypt’s post-revolution Constitution. Egyptians, especially the minority
Coptic Christian community feared that Islamization of Egypt would lead to greater religious
sectarianism. Many anticipated an Algerian civil war scenario, where in the 1990s, the militaryruled government of Colonel Chadli Bendjedid legalized political parties and an Islamist group
similar to the MB called the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) became the prominent political
adversary to the government. In Algeria, the military hoped “none of the new political parties
would be able to amass sufficient support to challenge truly the military-backed National
Liberation Front (FLN). However, it miscalculated, for Islamist parties were organizing
themselves rapidly increasing their support bases”.86 The FIS was able to win parliamentary
elections in 1990. Their victory caused the Algerian military to annul the election results, causing
an armed rebellion that lasted from 1990-1998, killing a hundred thousand Algerians.
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Sensing similarities to Algeria, the SCAF in July of 2011 introduced constitutional
provisions that gave them the legal basis to intervene in Egyptian politics under a broad array of
circumstances, including to protect the secular nature of the state87. This was an early indication
that showed the SCAF had limited trust with Islamist groups. Presidential elections were divided
into two rounds slated for May and June of 2012, giving political parties barely enough time to
prepare candidates for elections. The Egyptian military stated for the first time that it would not
field a candidate for President, leaving the door open for a civilian president. The MB, the largest
political bloc in parliament vowed not to field a candidate for president. Many saw this as
political rhetoric at the time to allay fears of a power grab by Islamist forces.
Twenty-three candidates filed to run for president; each with diverse backgrounds and
affiliations, giving Egyptians a real chance to choose a candidate that suited them. Not wanting
their majority in parliament to be triumphed by the eventual executive, the MB reversed course
and decided on fielding a presidential candidate with Mohamed Morsi.
The final round of elections pitted Morsi against Ahmad Shafiq the last Prime Minister
under Mubarak in a highly-boycotted election round. Many Egyptians felt that choosing between
an Islamist and a Mubarak crony did not represent the demands of the revolution for real change.
Morsi picked up 51% of the vote with 13.2 million ballots, compared to Shafiq’s 12.3 million
votes at 49%88. The SCAF, before transitioning power to Morsi, ordered the dissolution of
parliament on June 14th, 2012, through the Supreme Constitutional Court. The court cited
“misapplication of rules for independent candidates” during the election process as a significant
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violation of constitutional principles89. Islamist labeled the dissolution as a coup but stopped
short of calling for demonstrations, as the committee tasked with writing the constitution was left
untouched. The SCAF final decree on June 17th, 2012 removed significant foreign policy
decision-making powers from the executive and removed national security duties from the
president. The election of Morsi looked to be symbolic rather than substantial compared to the
vast powers the SCAF wielded from the barracks.
Supporters of the democratic process argued that the Egyptian military should adopt the
Turkish army model. As Sakallioglu describes in The Anatomy of the Turkish Military “The most
crucial feature of the Turkish military's political autonomy, which in turn distinguishes it from
armies elsewhere in the Third World, is its acceptance of the legitimacy of both democracy and
civilian rule”90. While the Egyptian military recognizes “rule” whether it be democratic or
autocratic it does so when its interests are aligned with that of the ruling government. The
Turkish military more often finds their interests aligning with the government. For example, the
Turkish military now favors the capitalist market economy system over the state-run economy, a
vast difference from the Egyptian military’s protection of their economic system. Similarities
between both armies rest on their belief in defending the nature of the secular state. In September
of 2012 over 300 Turkish military members were put on trial accused of plotting a coup to
prevent the Islamization of Turkish society from policies enacted by the Erdogan government.
Turkey’s strict secularism was engraved into the Muslim-majority country by Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk, and they feared that that vision was slipping away91. This type of subordination and
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vulnerability of officers at the hands of the ruling government was a scenario the Egyptian
military worked to avoid during the one-year rule of Morsi.
Morsi’s Battle With The Military
In jostling with the military for power, Morsi successfully sidelined the old guard of the
SCAF. August 2012 saw the retirement of Mubarak-era officials, with defense minister Tantawi,
army chief of staff Sami Anan and other senior generals forced into retirement92. Morsi signaled
moves towards aggressively reclaiming the political power that the military had enjoyed since
the fall of Hosni Mubarak.
In November of 2012, recognizing a legal decision ordering the dissolution of the
committee writing the constitution by Egypt’s High Court, Morsi issued a presidential decree,
giving his decisions immunity from judicial oversight. He defended his actions by “portraying
his order as an attempt to fulfill popular demands for justice and protect the transition to a
constitutional democracy”93. Revolutionary groups decried the move as a betrayal of their
claims. They quickly organized protests around the presidential palace, resulting in the deaths of
ten people mostly anti-Morsi demonstrators. Human Rights Watch charged that Morsi’s
December 6th speech where referred protesters as “hired thugs”, inflaming tensions, “Instead of
condemning illegal detentions and abuse right outside the presidential palace, President Morsi
spoke out against the victims”94 the report concluded. The military decided to intervene as
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unrests grew, positioning themselves carefully between protesters and the palace, appearing
reluctant to endorse or condemn the movement95.
Legal scholars argued the declaration was unprecedented, something the Mubarak
government never attempted over the course of 30 years. Morsi’s defiance gave him the upperhand as the committee survived legal scrutiny. Islamists rushed to complete the constitution amid
a boycott by the minority secular forces serving on the committee.
The political-Islam orientated constitution passed in a referendum held in December
2012. Secularist and human rights groups criticized the document as overreaching and imposing:
referring to articles “regulating women’s role as caregivers”96. The military’s role in the new
document was enhanced giving them the “authority to put civilians on trial in military courts, and
the task of adopting strategies for establishing security, identifying security threats, and taking
actions to address them”97. Also guaranteed in the constitution was an exemption from the ban
on forced labor allowing for the continuation of the military’s conscript labor system and secrecy
for the military’s institutional finances.
Maneuvering through political obstacles, Morsi sought to find common ground with the
army in the economic sector. In late 2012, Mori unilaterally declared an end to the privatization
of public sector companies. In an attempt to save military factories set for sell-offs under
economic restructuring plans. February 2013, an announcement posted on the FJP’s official party
website revealed that the MOMP had acquired the failed and highly indebted Al-Nasr
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Automotive Manufacturing Company98.The manufacturing and assembly of passenger cars and
other nonmilitary vehicles have always been central to the economic fortunes of Egypt’s
military, as the technologies, facilities, and equipment made available through the collaborative
manufacturing of military vehicles can also be used in the production of civilian vehicles sold by
the military on the domestic market.
The thaw between the two groups emerged when plans relating to the Suez Canal
expansion project strained the relationship. Ever since its opening in 1869, the canal has been a
focal point in Egyptian nationalism, something the military has abused to declare necessity to
control for themselves. For many years the military envisioned turning the Suez Canal into a
major logistics hub and center of heavy manufacturing. The military’s economic planners made
various gregarious proposals to establish solar, wind, and geothermal power stations in and
around Suez to capitalize on the area’s industrial manufacturing potential.
The military’s companies would play key roles in constructing and providing equipment
for such projects, as the MOMP have factories capable of manufacturing things like industrial
plants, steel, and textiles. FJP officials announced plans in early 2013 to turn the canal into a
global logistics hub; it seemed the political will and state support for such a project was finally
available99.
Egyptian government consultant revealed that oversight of the expansion would be in the
hands of a single chairman who would have the rank of deputy prime minister and report directly
to Morsi, relegating the military to just one among many government bodies involved in the
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effort. This move to marginalize the military’s role in the largest infrastructure project in decades
may have been critical to the FJP’s ultimate loss of military support100.
On March 19, 2013, Morsi announced that India was to be Egypt’s lead partner in the
massive expansion. Two days later, Defense Minister Sisi and other military official quoted in
newspaprs said that the government’s plans for the Suez expansion project would not move
forward until the army approved the details. Sisi warned against any foreign involvement in the
project that might cause future controversies, a direct challenge to Morsi and his negotiations
with foreign nations101.The backlash Morsi faced with the Suez led him to attempt to replace
Sisi. A plan that was ultimately abandoned in the face of opposition from within the military
establishment102.
Morsi in his attempt to establish a political and economic foothold ignored the decaying
state of Egypt’s tourism and security. The country was plagued by daily electrical outages and a
scarcity of gasoline supplies. Citizens complained about the lack of police presence and a rising
crime rate. The CSF two years after being decimated by the revolution were still unable to
restructure. Some attributed this vacuum under Morsi to the deep state. During the protests
around the administrative palace officers openly refused orders to disperse demonstrators. They
accused Morsi of attempting to politicize the interior ministry. Top-ranking officers trained with
the mindset of arresting MB members found themselves receiving orders from the very people
they once regularly arrested. Instead of focusing on resolving these issues, Morsi continued his
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campaign to solidify power by purging of thousands of judges he deemed to be sympathetic to
secular leanings103.
Youth organizations of April 6th and the Kifaya movement began calling for early
elections in April of 2012, citing Morsi’s failure in adhering to the demands of the revolution.
The “tamarod” movement known as “rebel” sought to gather 14 million signatures, one million
more than the 13 million Morsi received in the presidential elections104. Recent revelations
through audio-leaks suggest that the Egyptian intelligence played a funding role for tamarod. In
one such recording, top Generals Kamel and Sobhy say, “ we need two hundred thousand in
tamarod’s account…from mukhabarat (intelligence)” 105. The authenticity of these types remains
highly disputed. If the Egyptian military truly supported the tamarod movement, it would show
that indeed they studied the Turkish army’s policy regarding the Islamist-oriented rule, wherein
1997 the government of Necmettin Erbakan was forced to resign after the military moved to
“nullify the supposed Islamization of Turkey and fortify the secular system”106. Although the
definition of Islamization differs from Egypt to Turkey, the concept of a red line in regards to
how far religion plays a role in government and society is key.
Egyptians watched with increasing discomfort the rise of Islamic rhetoric on television
and radio stations. Hard-core Islamist preachers openly discussed their desires to see the
pyramids and other ancient monuments destroyed107. Salafists urged Egyptian Muslims not to
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wish Coptic Christians holiday greetings. These viewpoints resonated very negatively with
Egyptians, who for thousands of years viewed diversity and history as a foundation for Egyptian
identity. Strong public anger erupted again when Morsi appointed a former terrorist of Gamaa alIslamiyya as Governor of Luxor, the very city his organization terrorized in the 1990s108.
Morsi’s short-rule seemed to be heading towards him altering the economic system that
the military enjoyed. His foreign policy decisions were troubling for them. One example was his
stance of opening the gates of “jihad” on the Syrian government. The speech delivered in Cairo’s
Olympic soccer stadium on June 15th, 2013 attended by former jihadists who were imprisoned
under Mubarak, essentially committed Egypt to a brutal civil war. Promises of immunity for
Egyptians who travel to fight the infidel Syrian military and it is supporters alarmed the security
establishment109, who feared battle-trained fighters would look to launch other campaigns against
and from Egypt. This was substantiated just one day after the controversial speech when four
Egyptian Shiite Muslims were brutally murdered in Cairo110 .
June 30th, 2013 was chosen as the mass protest day against Morsi by the opposition. MB
and other Islamist movements labeled those participating in demonstrations as “religious
traitors” worthy of killing, giving the situation a possible religious undertone between moderates
and conservatives. Tens of millions of people descended on Egypt’s major cities demanding
Morsi accept early presidential elections or resign.
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Unlike the 2011 revolution, demonstrators did not face off against CSF members. In
many instances, the police openly participated in the protests and joined in on anti-Morsi chants.
Causalities and injuries from the anti-Morsi camp remained low as the days went on. The
Egyptian military showed in the early few days of the protest the military’s willingness to
intervene once again. A 48-hour ultimatum was issued to Morsi, where he was threatened with
intervention if he failed to compromise with demonstrators111.
Morsi in a speech refused to accept the core demands of the opposition and instead took
on a defiant tone. With the prospect of a collision between two rival camps, the military moved
in to remove Morsi from power. General Sisi surrounded by leaders of the opposition, the Coptic
Pope, Sunni scholars, and youth parties announced that the Chief Justice of the Constitutional
Court Aldy Monsour would act as interim president until new elections. The military suspended
the Islamist constitution by reinstating the 1971 constitution. Unlike 2011 revolution, the SCAF
did not take over governing duties but instead handed power to a technocratic administration, but
behind the scenes, the generals worked to destroy any opposition to the new status quo.
Military Dominance
Security forces backed by the army moved swiftly to arrest Morsi and the top leaders of
the Muslim Brotherhood. They aimed to take out at the backbone of support for ousted Morsi.
Embarking on dramatic steps, including arresting the group's spiritual leader, Mohammed Badie,
from a seaside villa and flew him by helicopter to detention in Cairo112. Khairat el-Shater, a
successful Brotherhood businessman, was also arrested and had his assets frozen. The two were
wanted for inciting the killing of protesters in front of the Brotherhood's headquarters in Cairo.
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Arrest warrants were issued for 300 top-ranking Brotherhood members. Egypt's public
prosecutor ordered Morsi and 35 co-accused to stand trial on charges including conspiring with
foreign organizations to commit terrorist acts in Egypt and divulging military secrets to a foreign
state113.
Supporters of Morsi and those against the coup by military amassed in Rabia al-Adawiya
Square in central Cairo to protest the events transpiring. On August 14, security forces crushed
the sit-in in Rabia al-Adawiya Square. Videos and a report by Amnesty International said that the
military used armored personnel carriers, bulldozers, ground forces, and snipers, attacked the
makeshift protest encampment, where demonstrators, including women and children, had been
camped out for over 45 days, and opened fire on the protesters, killing at least 817 and likely
more than 1,000114.
The Rabia event altered the political discourse completely. In the months after the
military-backed government banned street protests by applying jail time or heavy fines to the
public demonstrations115. Journalists, academics, students, and civil society members were all
subjected to arrest. The reality on the ground signaled that the peaceful nature of 2011 uprising
was now a distant memory.
General Sisi’s election to the Presidency with 97 percent of the vote in 2014 where the
opposition was non-existent amid crackdowns and arrests gave the military an unchecked seat to
rule Egypt once again. Today, 17 of Egypt’s 27 provincial governors are military generals, and
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the remaining civilian governors share rule with 24 major generals serving as deputy governors,
secretaries-general, and assistant secretaries-general116. A $12 billion dollar from Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, allowed Sisi to ignore economic policy temporarily. The
much-needed economic assistance was a strong indication of support for Sisi and a way to shore
up his legitimacy and viability.
Plans for the Suez Canal Corridor Development Project the one that led to the rupture
between the Muslim Brotherhood and Sisi is now firmly in the hands of the military-dominated
Suez Canal Authority and has even become more ambitious. The project involves the expansion
of six Egyptian ports, the construction of a number of tunnels and industrial zones, and the
dredging of a lateral canal to allow for two-way traffic. All being constructed by the Egyptian
Armed Forces Engineering Authority.
Conclusion:
Six years after the 2011 revolution, Egypt’s politics is once again dominated by the
military. The Arab Spring gave hope that tech-savvy youths could alter the power dynamics of
authoritarian governments in the region. In Egypt, youth-driven mass protests shook the
foundation of the 30-year rule of Mubarak. They sacrificed their lives and limbs in pursuit of
pro-democratic change. Their use of peaceful mass demonstrations certainly deserves
recognition. Their role while significant was limited in bringing the end of the government.
Analysts who focused solely on the role of the protesters failed to account for the resurgent
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return of the military to politics. This analysis presented how the military has kept its power
intact despite challenges from various governments.
Nasser and the free officers first established the role of the army as a beacon of panArabism whose destiny was to dominate the region. Military members filled prominent political
positions. As they grew in numbers so did criticisms leveled against them. Blunders and failed
policies nearly led to their collapse after the 1967 six-day war defeat. Sadat, in a reversal of his
predecessor, attempted to sideline the military from politics, removing them from key decisionmaking posts. His build up to Yom Kippur War gave Sadat the ability to keep the military
preoccupied. Their influence and demands were hard to ignore after the conclusion of hostilities
with Israel. As neo-liberal reforms were increased with Egypt’s Western alliance, so did violent
social episodes. Once again, the government found itself dependent on the military for stability
and protection.
Mubarak, after building up a vast network of business enterprises for the military, found
himself in the crosshairs of the military. The rise of a business elite led by his son Gamal, not
only threatened the military’s economic empire but caused large portions of Egyptians to live in
poverty. Mubarak failed to introduce democratic reforms. Instead, he focused on preserving the
political monopoly of the NDP hoping to pave the path for Gamal to attain the presidency. When
the 2011 revolution began, and Mubarak found himself without the brutal police state he had
empowered, it became apparent that the military would not sacrifice their dwindling influence in
politics by saving Mubarak. Instead, they let him fall, hoping that by leading the transition never
again would they be at the whim of the president.
Morsi’s presidential election victory was a test to post 2011 Egyptian politics.
Understanding the control the military held in the post-transition phase, he attempted to seize the
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power they enjoyed. Through a series of moves, it seemed he had the upper-hand against the
army, but he did not realize that most Egyptians repudiated the ideology of social and politicalIslam espoused by him and his allies. Instead, Egyptians looked to the military to defend the
secularism and diversity of Egypt when mass protests erupted in June 2013. Today, the military’s
power is not rivaled by any institution. Democratic reforms are non-existent under the
government of newly elected president and former general Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, the same person
who led the overthrow of Morsi. A violent terrorist campaign against the military in the Sinai
Peninsula by Islamic State affiliates has sidelined any discussion of political reforms before
security can be reestablished.
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